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ABSTRACT
Constitutional design has become a novel and globalized legal
profession. As such, practitioners in this new field-advisers and
consultants of constitutional formation and reformation processes-
require practical and comparative tools to ply their trade. This Note
attempts to fill a gap in constitutional design literature and provide such
a tool by methodically examining "primacy clauses." By determining
whether national or provincial law prevails when the two are in conflict,
primacy clauses play an important role in maintaining federal balances
of power. Three primacy approaches are found among the world's federal
constitutions: national primacy, provincial primacy, and conditional
primacy. This Note explores example constitutions for each approach and
discusses possible effects each approach may have on power balances.
Preliminary examinations suggest that conditional primacy may be more
sensitive to the underlying reasons for original divisions of power
between government levels; therefore, the conditional approach may be
worth further exploration as a more effective and flexible approach to
primacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional design has only recently emerged as a legal
discipline.1 This growing field of scholarship applies comparative,
empirical, and cultural frameworks to consider issues related to drafting
and reforming constitutions. A developed legal discipline of
constitutional design--considering, for example, the process of drafting,
the interaction between structural elements, and the inclusion of
individual and group rights-offers valuable and practical tools for
those who find themselves drafting or reforming a constitution, or
advising the process. By necessity, these leaders of reform processes,
and sometimes the nation as a whole, must consider a multitude of legal
constitutional theories and their application. This is no easy feat.
Consultants and advisers, no matter how steeped in local legal
traditions, often do not have the technical legal skills or knowledge
necessary to consider the vast array of constitutional mechanisms
available, let alone the ways in which these mechanisms interact and
form a comprehensive basis for a new system of governance. Often
finding themselves perplexed and unable to find the necessary
scholarship available, leaders will call upon foreign scholars and
consultants to advise them throughout the drafting process.
These foreign advisers and aspects of law, much like a traded
commodity, can easily travel in the globalized world.2 The free exchange
1. Cf. Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding and
Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 171 (1997) (exploring the waxing and
waning of the law and development movement). Constitutional design likely sprouts as a
sub-field of the recent revival of the law and development movement. Reaching its apogee
in the 1970s, this movement touted the importance of law and legal institutions in the
economic and social development of newly emerging and modernizing states. Id. at 169.
2. See Toby S. Goldbach, Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, The Movement of
U.S. Criminal and Administrative Law: Processes of Transplanting and Translating, 20
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 141 (2013) (analyzing the spread of U.S. domestic criminal
and administrative law into foreign domestic and international legal spheres). 'The new
normal is broad consultation of a range of international models and a facility for
translating multiple or even conflicting legal practices. This presents opportunities for
positive legal change and complicates efforts to locate clear sources of power in the
movement of law." Id. at 142. The spread of constitutional ideas may even be contagion-
like. David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1277, 1286-87 (2008) (observing the international spread of women's rights and
democratic norms as contagious). The globalization of these ideas is driven by many
factors, including a desire to achieve and exploit positive reputations for constitutional
protections of rights. Id. at 1288; see also Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993) (concluding that while there are certain globalizing
trends in various fields of law, domestic legal regimes are more responsive to global
changes in markets and politics rather than law). For example, "the recent worldwide
preoccupation with new written constitutions dividing government powers and
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of legal ideas and knowledge of constitutional mechanisms and
structures is necessary for the development of constitutional design, but
the globalization of such a young field could prove dangerous if its
professionals forget the contextual level in which they must ply their
trade. While there are arguably some principles that are universal, the
design and the content of a constitution must be completely informed by
local tradition, culture, politics, and history if legitimacy is to be
successfully conferred.3 Therefore, constitutional designers must never
haphazardly grab and apply "best practice" provisions from a global
constitutional menu;4 if they do so, they court disastrous effects. 5 On the
other hand, successful advising requires a freshly global and
comparative perspective on available constitutional mechanisms, their
theoretical underpinnings, and effective application. The dichotomy of
these needs-for the concurrent globalization and localization of
technical legal design and application-causes innumerable difficulties
for practitioners. "Guides for the perplexed" are needed to provide
guaranteeing individual rights, the spread of constitutional courts and constitutional
judicial review, and the fervor and effectiveness of the human rights movement"
demonstrate a globalized declining public approval of government institutions. Id. at 48.
Yet, it is important to note that the studies of these trends must depend as much on the
differences as the similarities among peoples, signifying the concomitant trends of
globalization and localization. See id. at 64.
3. See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528, 530 (1999)
(proposing the idea of "growing constitutions"--constitutions can only succeed "if they are
firmly planted in the cultural soil from which they gain legitimacy").
4. Consultants and advisers from intergovernmental organizations, foreign
embassies, foreign universities, and nonprofit organizations clamor to advise and
influence nations undergoing constitutional review or constitutional creation processes.
These constitutional designers are altruistic in purpose, but often arrive with only a
rudimentary idea of the country's systems, cultures, and history; additionally, they are not
aware of the key stakeholders and power players. Undoubtedly, without a relationship
with the key players and a thorough understanding of the country, a constitutional
designer will be ineffective at designing a successful constitution. A successful constitution
is not drafted with the help of a consultant who flies in for a lecture or conference and
then returns home; instead, an effective constitutional designer must earn the trust of key
stakeholders and understand the context of the nation's social problems and systems-
this requires years of relationship-building. To achieve both aspirational and
governmental structuring goals, a constitution should be highly contextual, and designers
and the design process should focus upon the social problems on the ground. See
Chibundu, supra note 1, at 171 ("[Ihe relevance of law for development must be grounded
in the experiences of the society under study and in ways giving form and meaning to
those experiences by their institutionalization, not through internationalizing the
societies, nor through a universalist or global conception of procedural mechanisms or
substantive rights and duties.").
5. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 542-49, for a review of the postcolonial political order
in Africa after constitutions accepting colonizer values were adopted, without an
understanding of the values of tribal and local peoples.
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practical and applicable information on the technical legal issues of
constitutional drafting and reform. 6
In order to fill a gap in the constitutional design literature and
provide practitioners with a basis for more practical reports, this article
will explore one structural mechanism meant to balance power within
federal systems. 7 What I have termed "primacy clauses" are, simply put,
constitutional provisions created to resolve conflicts between national
and provincial legislation.8 The most well-known example may be the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; however, the U.S.
approach (where federal law preempts conflicting state law) should not
be mistaken as the only method to solve legislative conflict in federal
systems. In an attempt to provide a tool for constitutional designers, but
even more so to catalyze a thorough examination of this important
balancing provision, I examined and classified the primacy clauses of all
current federal nations' constitutions, This typology will inform the
discussion on federal structuring in developing democracies, which is
directly affected by the difficulties of concurrent globalization and
localization trends in constitutional design and development.
In the developing world, the balance of power can become an "urgent
political and constitutional issue" that is determinative of whether rule
of law is possible. 9 The balance created by the initial, constitutionally
enshrined division of power is not static, and a primacy clause must
6. Scholarly literature must address the relevant issues of constitutional design from
the starting point of real world problems. From there, reports can provide the options,
which can then be explored and contextualized by practitioners based on the issues at
hand. A successful constitutional adviser will both provide information (i.e., a menu
system of options that includes the motivating reasons behind choices of design and the
implications of those choices) and facilitate the application of that information in an
organic and non-imposing manner. E-mail from Jason Gluck, Senior Program Officer,
United States Institute of Peace to Brady Harman (Jan. 12, 2015, 17:00 EST) (on file with
author).
7. Globalization has sparked a renewed interest in federalism. Populaces are
increasingly interested in being both global consumers and local citizens at the same time.
The strengthening of both international and local pressures has weakened the traditional,
centralized nation-state in favor of more decentralized approaches to power sharing. See
Ronald L. Watts, Contemporary Views on Federalism, in EVALUATING FEDERAL SYSTEMS
1, 5 (Bertus De Villiers ed., 1994). A trend toward and difficulties with decentralization
can easily be seen contemporarily through the number of recent and ongoing attempts at
secession (e.g., Scotland, Catalan).
8. See infra Part I for an explanation of terminology. Surprisingly, there is currently
no common language within legal literature for constitutional provision(s) that resolve
conflict between national and provincial legislation. "Primacy clause" shall hopefully serve
as a seminal common identifier for these types of constitutional mechanisms that
maintain power balances within federal systems.
9. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768
(1994).
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secure that balance when conflicts between laws arise, as they
inevitably will. Therefore, it is imperative that designers of new or
reformed constitutions understand and consider various approaches to
primacy. As explored below, most primacy clauses are simplistic; they
may do little to protect the balance of power and may actually
exacerbate the siphoning of power to one level of government-toward
the central government in most instances. However, some federal
systems utilize a more complex primacy clause that may more
accurately maintain a balance of power, regardless of whether that
balance is static.or shifting.
Section I will develop the definition and explore the importance of
primacy clauses as a mechanism of federalism. Section II will introduce
a typology for the classification of primacy clauses and provide empirical
evidence of their prevalence amongst current federal systems. Primacy
clauses are classified by approach: national primacy, provincial
primacy, and conditional primacy. Examples of each type of primacy
clause will be explored within the context of their home constitutions to
illustrate how each approach functions; related considerations and
associated problems will also be assessed. Finally, the concluding
section will preliminarily compare the types of primacy clauses and
expound upon their possible relative strengths. Ideally, this article will
serve as a foundational typology by which the implications of primacy
approaches on the balance of power and effectiveness of federal systems
may be further explored.
I. FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE PRIMACY CLAUSE
Simply put, federalism is a system that organizes and distributes
political power in a way that will enable the common needs of the people
to be achieved while also accommodating the diversity of their
circumstances and preferences. 10 At the time of formation, federal
constitutions divide and distribute power between the national
government and provincial government-hopefully with enough
foresight to forge a balance of power that meets the needs cited for
choosing federalism in the first place. The relative strength of the
various levels of government, and the overall stability of the system
itself, is predicated upon this initial division of powers within the
constitution; but maintenance of stability depends upon constitutional
10. Watts, supra note 7, at 5-6.
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provisions that resolve any subsequent legislative conflict between
levels-primacy clauses. 1
A. Intrinsic Conflict in Competitive and Cooperative Federal Systems
Federal systems and their constitutive balancing mechanisms are
extremely complex and vary among the approximately twenty-seven
contemporary modern federal nations. 12 Choosing federalism and a
particular constitutional distribution of power is motivated by a variety
of reasons. The chosen distribution typically reflects an extant balance
of powers that is already present or is meant to actualize a balance that
has eluded the country thus far. 13 To understand primacy clauses and
their effectiveness, one must first understand divisions of power
between provincial and national government. 14 Broad implications of
typical power divisions are briefly discussed below, but the motivating
reasons and goals behind these divisions must also be thoroughly
11. A fairly comprehensive exploration of the variances on power distribution in
federal systems exists in scholarship today. See generally, e.g., A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON
FEDERALISM: DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES
(Akhtar Majeed et al. eds., 2006), for a comparative discussion on power distribution as a
core theme of federalism. However, when the literature considers power balancing, there
is little comparative discussion of how a constitutional mechanism triggered during times
of legislative conflict can affect the proliferation and implementation of initial divisions of
power. A more robust examination of these relationships could be highly informative in
the constitutional design process.
12. See Federalism By Country, FORUM OF FEDERATIONS (Jan. 1, 2013),
http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/federalismbycountry.php for a base list of federal
countries. I have added South Sudan to and removed Spain from this list. Spain is often
considered a de facto federation because of its strong autonomous communities, but it will
be considered a unitary system here for ease of analysis. The constitutions of the following
countries were analyzed in pursuit of this typology: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany, India,
Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, St. Kitts & Nevis,
South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United States,
and Venezuela.
13. See Gordon, supra note 3, for a discussion of the colonial and postcolonial political
orders and their effects on postcolonial constitutions.
14. The use of the term "national" (rather than "federal" or "central") and "provincial"
(rather than "state," "community," or "territory") will be used throughout this article to
denote the national and the main sub-national level of government, respectively. This is in
an effort to avoid confusion created by the varied terminology used amongst different
countries. Additionally, only levels of government with legislative power are considered
here; therefore, local divisions with only administrative powers are not addressed.
However, it should be noted that administrative power, especially in highly devolved
systems, should not be ignored when considering power balancing during the design
process.
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understood when considering the role of primacy clauses in balance
maintenance.
The U.S. Constitution is representative of clear dualistic divisions of
power between the state and federal government. The U.S. Constitution
enumerates a few express powers of the federal government. 15 Implied
powers of the federal government are read as flowing from these express
powers and the elastic clause of the Constitution. 16 The Tenth
Amendment goes on to state, "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."17 Therefore, U.S.
states have residual powers that are not allotted to the federal
government by the Constitution. This initial allotment of power-
limited enumerated federal power and substantial residual powers for
states--creates and reflects a constitutional predilection for increasingly
powerful and competitive states.1 8 To be successful, the division and
balance of powers must rest on an "appropriate balance between
cooperation and competition" between the national and provincial
government. 19 Whether balance is based more on cooperation or
competition, conflict between levels of government will always present
itself.
Many other federal systems have constitutions that contain, often
more comprehensively, a set of enumerated lists that explicitly create
shared responsibility: express national powers, express provincial
powers, and mixed or concurrent powers that are shared between the
two levels of government. The complex division of competence to include
shared and supporting roles between levels of governance relates to the
increasingly prevalent concept of cooperative or "marble cake"
federalism. 20 For example, the European Union and its member states
15. Federal powers are largely expressed within Article 1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
16. See generally M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (referring to the Necessary
and Proper Clause, which permits Congress to seek objectives within its enumerated
powers as long as it is rationally related to the objective and not forbidden by the
Constitution; Chief Justice John Marshall narrowly limits the authority of state
governments and broadly construes Congress's powers).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
18. Within "the vast realm that lies beyond the national government's reach," the
states compete for the assets and attention of citizens. Michael S. Greve, Against
Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 558 (2000).
19. Daniel J. Elazar, International and Comparative Federalism, 26 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 190, 193 (1993).
20. "Marble-cake federalism" was likely first coined by Morton Grodzins in reference to
an evolving American federalism; he suggested that, rather than symbolizing the
government as a three-layer cake, a more accurate image would be a marble cake,
"characterized by an inseparable mingling of differently colored ingredients...As colors are
mixed in the marble cake, so functions are mixed in the American federal system." Morton
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have divided competencies into exclusive, shared, and supporting
categories. 21 Additionally, special categories of competence are specified
for EU action within the spheres of economic and employment policy,
and common foreign and security policy.2 2 Inevitably, this system's
complex and overlapping division of power creates conflicts of law
between the EU and member nations. Beyond inherent conflict caused
by initial power divisions, conflict may also be motivated by a fear of
cooperation as a form of coercion by a central government. 23 Therefore,
even within more cooperative federal systems, conflict is present and
primacy clauses are essential. To prevent any eventual competence
creep, there must be an attempt to define ex ante criteria for the
resolution of conflicting laws. However, the interconnection of
regulatory areas within cooperative systems are often so complex as to
make the establishment of clear dividing lines difficult.24 Thereby, this
may limit the ability of ex ante criteria, such as primacy clauses, to
regulate central intervention.
Cooperative federalism and comprehensive constitutional
enumerations of shared power are common beyond the European
Union 25 and may reflect the decentralizing forces of globalization. The
various challenges of globalization create a need for cooperation and the
synchronization of policies across governmental levels.26  Even
federalism in the United States, traditionally thought to rest on a
strongly competitive foundation, has seen an increased role of the
Grodzins, The Federal System, in GOALS FOR AMERICANS: THE REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GOALS 265 (1960).
21. See generally PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BtRCA, EU LAW 78-87 (5th ed. 2011)
(discussing the details of exclusive competence, shared competence, and supporting action
as defined by Articles 2(1), 2(2), and 2(5) of the TFEU, respectively).
22. See id. at 88-89 (discussing TFEU Articles 5 and 2(4), concerning economic,
employment, and social policy, and common foreign and security policy, respectively).
23. See Elazar, supra note 19, at 194.
24. ANTONIO ESTELLA, THE EU PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS CRITIQUE 113-114
(2002). Further investigation is needed to determine the intricacies of the relationship
between primacy clauses and the complexities of administrative and regulatory
cooperation.
25. Germany may be the most well-known example of cooperative federalism with
complex divisions of responsibility between Lander and the federal government, requiring
high levels of cooperation. UWE THAYSEN, THE BUNDESRAT, THE LANDER, AND GERMAN
FEDERALISM 14 (1994). Some scholars argue that the unclear assignment of competencies
has strangled economic success of the Lander and a more competitive system is necessary.
See Bernhard Seliger, From the Cooperative Trap to Competition: Reform Perspectives for
Fiscal Federalism in Germany 17-18 (Hanns Seidal Found., Working Paper No. 05-02,
2002), available at http://www.hss.de/fileadmin/korea/downloads/EWPS_05-02.pdf.
26. See Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in
an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 530 (2009).
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federal government in state administration. 27 However, no matter how
cooperative, the traditionally competitive predilections of federalism
hamper the harmonization of policies and signify that conflict is
inherently present in multilevel collaboration.28
B. Primacy Clauses and the Balance of Power
The initial constitutional division of power sets the stage for all
future conflict by determining later proclivities for cooperation and
competition. 29 No matter the effectiveness of this initial division, there
is always cause for conflict between levels, and an effective means of
conflict resolution is thereby required in all federal systems. 30
Therefore, calculating the appropriate balance of national and
provincial powers in federal countries requires consideration of both the
enumerated division of powers and, just as importantly, the primacy
clause.
By its nature, no constitution will ever be able to enumerate the
division of power in enough detail to provide answers to the infinite
number of problems faced by a governing structure. Written
constitutions "can [only] establish the broad grooves in which a nation-
state develops," and political forces, rather than constitutional text,
determine what happens in those grooves. 31 Beyond the desire of
27. American federalism has become more cooperative as state governments
administer federal programs and the federal government funds state programs. Also,
conditional preemption requires states to cede regulatory fields to the federal government
if they do not administer a federal program or regulate according to federal standards.
Greve, supra note 18, at 558. "Conditional preemption ... forces the states to choose
between two threats to their sovereignty: They must either accept the indignity of
implementing federal regulation or acquiesce in the displacement of their authority by the
federal government." Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 425 (1998). See generally MICHAEL S. GREVE,
THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (2012) for a critical analysis of the decreasing
competitiveness of American federalism.
28. See Blank, supra note 26, at 530.
29. As such, a later study may want to assess a possible correlation between initial
divisions of power, the type of primacy clause found in the constitution, and the level of
multilevel cooperation.
30. Additionally, while the most effective division of powers possible would
substantially reduce inter-level conflict and reduce the need for a primacy clause, power
distribution needs may change over time. This means that primacy clauses could also
serve as an important tool for purposeful and progressive shifts in power distribution,
rather than solely the maintenance of the original distribution.
31. PETER RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY 34 (3d ed. 2004) ("The great conceit of
constitution-makers is to believe that the words they put in the constitution can with
certainty and precision control a country's future. The great conceit of those who apply a
written constitution is to believe that their interpretation captures perfectly the founders'
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expansion by a level of government, conflict results from a "lack of legal
precision on the extent of the powers."32 Even if a constitution
enumerates the minutiae of powers of every level of government, there
will be problems of classification. For example, if a nation allots power
over the military to the national government and power over education
to the provinces, a military school could be classified as a military power
or an education power. So which level of government will manage the
creation and administration of such a school? Whether one level of
government moves to expand their competence or both levels share
concurrent administration, conflict is inevitable. The legal doctrine to
solve these national-provincial conflicts is prescribed within a
constitutional primacy clause and interpreted by a constitutional
court.3
3
A primacy clause is a usually simple constitutional provision that
determines the "winner" when there is a conflict between national and
provincial legislation. As explored below, the most common primacy
clause results in absolute national primacy. For example, the Australian
Constitution states, "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of
the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the
extent of the inconsistency, be invalid."34 The U.S. Constitution's
Supremacy Clause is another example of a national primacy clause. It is
extremely rare to see a primacy clause doing the opposite and
preempting national legislation in favor of provincial legislation.
Finally, more complex primacy provisions that provide for conditional
primacy also exist. Unlike the more common absolutist approaches,
conditional primacy clauses enumerate conditions, criteria, or processes
to determine a "winner" dependent upon the situation.
I have chosen to name this genre of constitutional provisions as
"primacy" rather than "supremacy" clauses for two reasons. First, I wish
to avoid confusion with the U.S. Supremacy Clause. Although the
Supremacy Clause is indeed a founding example of one primacy clause
approach, it is not representative of the clauses used in all countries.
Second, "primacy" conveys a preeminence and superiority without the
intentions. Those who write constitutions are rarely single-minded in their long-term
aspirations. They harbor conflicting hopes and fears about the constitution's evolution.").
32. Hugues Dumont et al., Kingdom of Belgium, in 2 A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON
FEDERALISM: DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 34,
56 (Akhtar Majeed et al. eds., 2006).
33. It should be noted that political landscape often predetermines the method of
conflict resolution. For example, if there are symmetrical coalition governments across
levels, cooperative agreements are more likely to be used, rather than the legal invocation
of primacy clauses, which would result in a more adversarial litigation process of conflict
resolution. Id.
34. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONS 109.
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sense of finality inherent in the term "supremacy."35 Therefore,
"primacy" is more inclusive of the conditional approach, which does not
call for the outright dominance of one level found in the other two
absolutist approaches.
Primacy clauses are an extremely important yet understudied
mechanism in federalism, as they are possibly predictive of the long-
term balance of power between national and provincial governments.
Conflict is unavoidable in a federal system; 36 therefore, the method of
conflict resolution serves as a bellwether of the direction in which power
will likely be siphoned over time. For example, I hypothesize that a
strong national primacy clause inevitably correlates with a national
government that is accorded more power over time. Under this type of
primacy clause, whenever there is some semblance of a relationship to
an explicit or implicit national power and a conflict between levels
arises, provincial law will be preempted. This a priori predilection for
national governments will enable the expansion of national power to the
extent that it encroaches upon and even subsumes enumerated or
residual provincial power. 37
Countries choose, create, and develop federal systems to strike
different balances of power for different reasons. For example, the
balance needed may be between varied populations to prevent ethnic
conflict, thereby requiring the creation of a thin layer of culture that
binds a heterogeneous people together into one nation. 38 In this case, if
a national primacy clause haphazardly enables power to siphon toward
a national government controlled by an oppressive majority ethnic
35. The dictionary defines "primacy" as "the state of being most important or
strongest." Primacy Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.coml
dictionary/primacy (last visited Mar. 21, 2015). "Supremacy" is defined as "the quality or
state of having more power, authority, or status than anyone else: the state of being
supreme." Supremacy Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
dictionary/supremacy (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).
36. Watts, supra note 7, at 15.
37. This may be especially troublesome in a globalized world where legislative
centralization is common, even whilst administrative decentralization continues. For
example, "[a]fter a strongly federative phase in the 1950s a creeping centralization has
occurred as a result of the [German] federal government's almost exclusive use of its
concurrent legislative jurisdiction, to the point where Germany is now described as a
unitary type of federalism." Hans-Peter Schneider, The Federal Republic of Germany, in 2
A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM: DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN
FEDERAL COUNTRIES 124, 127 (Akhtar Majeed et al. eds., 2006).
38. Constitutional structural techniques can be utilized to reduce ethnic conflict. See
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 601 (2000). "Thin culture" here
signifies an expression of common values that is thin enough to not conflict with the
varied cultures of a multiethnic country, but which is enough to hold that country
together. Constitutional structure can induce this binding element by creating common
legal rights, core values, and institutional participation.
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group, a slippery slope toward cultural dominance precludes federalism
from achieving its goal of balanced governance and the protection of
non-dominant or local cultures. On the other hand, if a provincial
primacy clause is present and enables the siphoning of power to the
provincial governments, there is a threat of ineffective central common
governance. This could result in a slippery slope toward secession and
the end of the nation-state.
Beyond cultural difference, there are many additional reasons for
federal devolution of power: the provincial government may act more
speedily than the national government when addressing certain issues;
the local government would be more effective in some areas because of
local knowledge (e.g., a crumbling bridge needs repair); the provinces
may need to check a powerful, disconnected, and far-away national
government; provincial government involves more people and more
adequately fulfills principles of democracy; or the national government
may be indifferent or even hostile because of identity issues. The
contemporary context of social problems, history, political and economic
institutions, culture, and many other factors will motivate a decision to
create a system of federalism and determine the balance of power
between the national and provincial governments; there is no perfect
balance, only a successful balance for a specific country at a specific
time.
Mindful of the need for more thorough study, I only hazard to
suggest that when considering primacy clauses, constitution drafters
should sacrifice some clarity in favor of effectiveness. A division of
powers between multiple levels of government is created for complex
and politically motivated reasons; therefore, the maintenance of that
division-assuming that maintenance is preferable-will also require a
tailored and flexible approach. Powers are devolved to provinces for
radically variable reasons. The maintenance of the power balance would
require similar consideration of these contextual factors when
determining primacy.
Primacy clauses are understudied and underappreciated. Although
simplicity is typical, primacy provisions that are overly absolute may
disturb the balance of power through unintentional siphoning, thereby
directly contributing to a drift of power that results in the demise of a
federal system. Contrarily, conditional primacy clauses may effectively
stabilize the initial balance of power or even act as a mechanism by
which ineffective ex ante divisions of power are corrected or realigned.
Either way, primacy clauses should be a centerpiece in scholarship on
federalism and divisions of power. Even more importantly, constitution
drafters and constitutional designers must consider primacy clauses and
their long-term effects on federal structures.
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II. A TYPOLOGY OF PRIMACY CLAUSES
As they have not yet been classified as such, nor explored in a
comparative sense, a typology of the various iterations of constitutional
primacy clauses found in modern federal systems is needed. By studying
the current constitutions of twenty-seven federal nations, 39 primacy
clauses have been placed into three categories based on how they
resolve conflict between national and provincial law: the national
primacy approach, the provincial primacy approach, and the conditional
primacy approach.40 Each approach will be explored below by analyzing
the express provisions of a few sample nations' constitutions. While
some of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each approach can be
ascertained from analysis of the express provisions, additional study is
needed to examine the clauses within the nexus of other provisions that
affect the balance of power.
A. National Primacy Approach
The national primacy approach is by far the most common type of
primacy clause found in the constitutions of modern federal nations. Of
the nineteen federal countries with explicit primacy clauses, fifteen of
them fall within this approach. The United States and Australia will be
explored below as exemplars of this approach. Other countries that
follow this approach include Bosnia and Herzegovina (art. III 3(b)),
Brazil (art. 24(4)), Canada, Comoros (art. 8), Germany (art. 31),
Malaysia (art. 75), Mexico (art. 133), Nigeria (art. 4(5)), Russia (art.
39. The web-based Constitute Project was utilized to examine the relevant
constitutions in English. The following countries' constitutions were examined: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia,
Germany, India, Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, St.
Kitts & Nevis, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates,
United States, and Venezuela. Explore Constitutions, CONSTITUTE, https://www.
constituteproject.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
40. Constitutions of eight federal systems do not fit within this typology. The
constitutions of five nations (Argentina, Ethiopia, Micronesia, Nepal, and Venezuela) do
not make any explicit reference to resolving conflict between national and provincial law.
The constitutions of Austria and the United Arab Emirates empower the Constitutional
Court and Federal Supreme Court, respectively, to resolve conflicts of competence, but do
not provide any explicit guidance to the Court. See BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG]
[CONSTITUTION] BGB1 No. 1/1930, art. 138 (Austria); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
ARAB EMIRATES [1971] art. 99(2). The constitution of Belgium leaves the question of
conflict resolution methodology to be determined by federal law. 2012 CONST. art. 141
(Belg.).
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76(5)), St. Kitts & Nevis (art. 103(2)), South Sudan (Transitional
Constitution, Schedule E), and Switzerland (art. 49).41
Australia demonstrates the simplicity typical of national primacy
clauses. Just one sentence ensures that national law preempts any
conflicting provincial law. Section 109 of the Australian Constitution
states, "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the
Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the
extent of the inconsistency, be invalid."42
For purposes of Section 109, inconsistency arises:
(i) where simultaneous obedience to the law of the
Commonwealth and to the law of the State is impossible;
(ii) where the law of the State takes away or varies a
right, privilege, duty, power or immunity conferred by a
law of the Commonwealth (or, conversely, a law of the
Commonwealth takes away or varies a right, privilege,
duty, power or immunity conferred by law of the State);
or (iii) where the law of a State invades a field which the
law of the Commonwealth was intended to cover
exhaustively.43
The presence of inconsistency, per the factors above, attracts the
operation of Section 109 to invalidate conflicting state law, but
invalidity is not produced directly. 44 Section 109 only operates on state
law that has already been lawfully enacted; it does not support national
41. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (art. III 3(b)); CONSTITUIQAO FEDERAL
[C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 24, para. 4 (Braz.); Comoros Constitution (art. 8);
GRUNDGESETZ F'UR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW],
May 23, 1949, BGBl. I at art. 31 (Ger.); Constitution of Malaysia (art. 75); Constituci6n
Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended 2007, art. 133, Diario Oficial
de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), §
4(5); KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKoI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 76, § 5
(Russ.); St. Kitts & Nevis Constitution, 1983 (art. 103(2)); Transitional Constitution of the
Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (Schedule E); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV][CONSTITUTION]
Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 49 (Switz.). "Section 90 [of the Canadian Constitution] gives
the federal government the unilateral power to 'disallow' (invalidate) any provincial
legislation" through the provisions found in Section 56. Richard Simeon & Martin
Papillon, Canada, in 2 A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM: DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 91, 99 (Akhtar Majeed et al. eds., 2006).
Section 92A(3) contains a more traditional national primacy clause but only relates
directly to non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources, and electrical energy.
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, art. 92A(3) (U.K.).
42. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONS 109.
43. Felman v Law Inst. (Vic) (1997) 142 FLR 362 (Austl.).
44. Id. (citing W. Austl. v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 464-65 (Austl.)).
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laws that purport to prohibit state parliament lawmaking ex ante.45
Much like the United States, the initial distribution of enumerated
constitutional powers to the Commonwealth and residual powers to the
states means that inconsistency (i.e., conflict) between legislative
provisions governing the same matter is inevitable. Section 109, the
national primacy clause, prescribes which law shall prevail, but
consistent with most primacy approaches of this type, the invalidation
(i.e., preemption) of provincial law does not encompass the entirety of
the affected legislation. 46 In Australia, and most other federal systems,
"[s]tate law remains valid though it is rendered inoperative to the
extent of the inconsistency, but only for so long as the inconsistency
remains."47
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution is likely the most
influential primacy clause used by a competitive federal system, 48 but
the complexity of its concepts makes it unique. Article VI, Section 2 of
the U.S. Constitution reads,
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any state to the Contrary notwithstanding. 49
45. See Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 121 (Austl.).
46. Most constitutions with national primacy clauses explicitly state that provincial
law is only preempted to the extent of the inconsistency. For example, the primacy clauses
of Pakistan ("the Act of the Provincial Assembly shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be
void."), Canada ("the law of Parliament prevails to the extent of the conflict."), and Nigeria
('and that other Law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.") include language
similar to the Australian clause. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 143; Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, art. 92A(3) (U.K.); CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA
(1999), § 4(5).
47. W. Austl. v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 464-65 (Austl.).
48. The federal system of the United States has proven highly influential in the
creation and construction of federal systems around the world. Federalism has taken on
new appeal, and while it has many variations, the '%old experiment" of the U.S.
Constitutional Convention has served as a model for the division of powers and thereby
merits special attention for the American primacy clause, the Supremacy Clause. A.E.
Dick Howard, A Traveler from an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative
Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INTL L. 3, 25-26 (2009).
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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Let us first simplify and then consider the elements that set the U.S.
primacy clause apart from other clauses of the national primacy
approach.
Article VI, Section 2 directly states that the Constitution, federal
laws, and treaties take precedence and preempt any conflicting state
laws or constitutions. This seems at odds with some of the founding
principles of the United States. James Madison viewed "We the People"
as the source of the legitimate exercise of federal power: legitimate
power originates from the periphery-the states-rather than the
center, as had been the common European view at the time.50 The
Constitution, which defined a limited number of exclusive federal
powers but assigned all residual powers to the states, reflected this
viewpoint. The Founders yearned for a nation with a central
government strong enough to be effective but not strong enough to
usurp the role of the states. By designing the principal branches of the
government to be dependent upon the states, the Founders thought the
federal law-making process would inherently protect states' rights; the
process would beget a system with a "disposition too obsequious [rather]
than too overbearing towards" the states.5 1
The clause recognizes three sources of law that are the "the supreme
Law of the Land": the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties of the
United States. 52 Uniquely, the clause only encompasses the laws of the
United States that "shall be made in Pursuance" of the Constitution-
thus not every federal law qualifies.5 3 Therefore, beyond primacy in
conflict, the Supremacy Clause calls for active judicial policing of the
bounds of federal power exercised by Congress, requiring a court to
determine what law is supreme and "made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution-what laws fall within an explicit or implicit enumerated
power in the Constitution. 54 The U.S. Constitution is unique in that the
primacy clause itself expressly impresses the courts, including state
50. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 122 (2010). But see
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 402-04 (1819) for John Marshall's famous assertions
that federal authority is derived directly from the people as a whole rather than via the
states.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
52. Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 99 (2003).
53. Id.
54. Id.; see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1348 (2001) (expounding upon the other possible methods of
enforcement considered at the constitutional convention--executive force, congressional
negative).
MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER
judges, into the policing of state law and the subordination of state law
to federal law. 55
Whatever their original intentions, U.S. Constitution drafters did
not foresee the tilting effects of expansive judicial interpretations of
federal powers and the Supremacy Clause. 56 They originally viewed the
Supremacy Clause as necessary to ensure that the Constitution did not
become a "mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and
not a government."57 Indeed, it did achieve that goal and contributed to
much more.
According to some, "American federalism has [now] become an
administrative, 'cooperative federalism': state and local governments
administer and implement federal programs."58 It is no secret that U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence, largely via interpretation of the commerce
clause and Supremacy Clause, has resulted in the extreme expansion of
national power since the founding of the United States. 59
The Great Depression and the resultant policies of the New Deal
resulted in considerable growth of government that continued
throughout the 1960s and 1970s with the creation of large-scale
cooperative programs.60 This would not have been possible if the
Supremacy Clause did not allow for the unconditional preemption of
55. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity
and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 764
(1998). The police functions of the courts are supported in other constitutional provisions
as well. See U.S. CONST. art. III (parallel language to the Supremacy Clause, stating that
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases "arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the united States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority."); U.S. CONST. amend. X. Most other national primacy clauses do
not directly refer to court monitoring and enforcement of jurisdictional boundaries. Like
the United States, the Mexican primacy clause would also serve as an exception in this
respect. See Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
art. 133, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
56. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226-28 (2000) (discussing
express and field preemption); Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights:
Original Understandings, Modern Misreadings, 43 VILL. L. REV. 17, 18 (1998) (referencing
Wickard's effects on preemption); see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 376-401 (2d ed. 2002) (providing a general background of problems associated with
preemption doctrine).
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 286 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating
that "all of the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution, so far as they exceed
those enumerated in the Confederation would have been annulled, and the new Congress
would have been reduced to the same impotent condition with their predecessors").
58. Greve, supra note 18, at 558.
59. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 56, at 230-38 (describing the framework set in the
seminal case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which defines the scope of federal legislative
power expansively and limits the ability for states to interfere).
60. See Greve, supra note 18, at 577.
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state laws that conflicted with national law. A slew of cases, decided in
the early twentieth century, expanded the powers of the federal
government and broadened the amount of state law that would be in
conflict and thereby preempted. 61 Until recently, there had been no
holdings by the Supreme Court to reverse this trend by limiting federal
power.62 The issue is further complicated by the Tenth Amendment,
where the Supreme Court has vacillated between interpretive
approaches-one that protects a zone of exclusive control for the states
and one that does not.6 3 The Supremacy Clause has not only been
unable to stop the siphoning of power toward the federal government
and the resultant tilting of the balance of powers, but it may also have
actually enabled the process through absolute preemption of conflicting
state law. 64
There have been suggested reforms to reduce conflict preemption,
including "finding a conflict between state and federal law only if it is
physically impossible to comply with both-a proposal that would
dramatically reduce the preemptive scope of federal statutes."6 5
However, because the reform would likely lack the permanency of a
constitutional amendment, a later court could easily undo this "direct
conflict" doctrine. Alternatively, some argue that subsidiarity principles
could have a place in U.S. law, 66 but the concomitant doctrine of
harmonization does not fit within the meaning of the non obstante
wording of the U.S. Supremacy Clause-the last provision of the clause
61. See generally, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see
also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
62. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court invalidates a federal law
for exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause for the first time in decades.
63. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 56, at 304-05.
64. See McAffee, supra note 56, at 18-19 (stating that Framers were wrong to assume
that the limited grant of authority would be sufficient means to secure a wide range of
rights in our system of fundamental law).
65. Nelson, supra note 56, at 231. Some argue that within politicized federalism
environments direct conflict doctrine could result in mechanical over-regulation, but
within the context of Canadian constitutional law, the test has proven to be successfully
protective of provincial law. Victoria Bronstein, Conflicts, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
SOUTH AFRICA 16-5 to -9 (Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop eds., 2d ed. 2014).
66. "Subsidiarity insists that governmental power to deal with a particular kind of
problem should rest in the hands of the smallest unit of government capable of dealing
successfully with that kind of problem." BREYER, supra note 50, at 123; see id. at 123-25,
132-33 (explaining the basics of the subsidiarity principle, how the concept prefers
decentralization, and what role it may play in preemption); see also George A. Bermann,
Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United
States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994) (exploring the role of subsidiarity in the United
States).
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"rejects a general presumption that federal law does not contradict state
law."
6 7
It would be reasonable to hypothesize that those countries following
the national primacy approach will discover a predilection for upward
power-siphoning, similar to the United States. However, a primacy
clause is only one factor amongst a constellation of constitutional and
extra-constitutional factors that may tip the original balance of
powers. 68 Although possibly abated by a division of powers favoring
provincial law, 69 a national supremacy approach for conflict resolution
seemingly results, ceteris paribus, in the eventual tilting of the balance
of powers toward the central government.
B. Provincial Primacy Approach
The provincial primacy approach is the diametrically opposed
absolutist approach to conflict resolution, with results oppositional to
those of the national primacy approach. This constitutional approach for
primacy clauses allows for the primacy of provincial or regional law
when it is in conflict with national legislation. Predictably, this is an
extremely rare method for federal constitutions to employ. Of the
nineteen federalist countries with explicit primacy clauses, only one
67. Nelson, supra note 56, at 293; see id. at 292-98 (providing a textual analysis of the
"non obstante" language in the U.S. Supremacy Clause).
68. Further study of judicial application of the national primacy clause, the initial
constitutional distribution of powers, and relevant political and economic circumstances is
required to fully understand the effects of a particular clause within wider nexus of its
home constitution and national system. For example:
Despite its original rigidity, the division of powers in Canada turned
out to be highly permissive.... Its original, highly centralized division
of powers has evolved - through judicial interpretation and political
developments - into a much more decentralized arrangement. The
limited asymmetry set out in the Constitution has also evolved into a
high degree of functional asymmetry .... [A]djustments have been the
result of intergovernmental bargaining and informal agreements. The
result is neither clear nor coherent, but it is workable.
Simeon & Papillon, supra note 41, at 115.
69. An original division of powers, a constitutional context, and a culture that values
decentralization of power will counteract the centralizing tendencies of a strong national
primacy clause. For example, despite the presence of a national primacy clause, the Swiss
Confederacy's commitment to general principles of direct democracy and a bottom-up
approach to dividing powers between the different levels of government seem to have
counteracted any resultant predilections for centralization. Switzerland's flexible
federalism has enabled political contest to strike the right equilibrium between the
functional requirements of a modern state and its federalist commitments. Thomas
Fleiner, Swiss Confederation, in 2 A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM: DISTRIBUTION OF
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 266, 286-87 (Akhtar Majeed et al.
eds., 2006).
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follows this approach. Iraq's primacy clause provisions are found under
both the section delineating powers of the federal government and
powers of the regions, Articles 115 and 121(second), respectively:
115. All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of
the federal government belong to the authorities of the
regions and governorates that are not organized in a
region. With regard to other powers shared between the
federal government and the regional government,
priority shall be given to the law of the regions and
governorates not organized in a region in case of
dispute.70
121(Second). In case of a contradiction between regional
and national legislation in respect to a matter outside
the exclusive authorities of the federal government, the
regional power shall have the right to amend the
application of the national legislation within that
region.71
In the case of dispute between legislation concerning the shared powers
of the federal government and the regional or governorate (provincial)
governments, courts will generally give priority to the regional or
governate legislation.7 2
Considering that there are only nine powers listed as exclusively
belonging to the federal government and "the allocation of power in
pivotal areas remains vague,"73 this could be an extremely influential
70. Article 115, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005.
71. Article 121(Second), Section 5, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of
the Republic of Iraq) of 2005. Note that whilst Article 115 applies to regions, provinces,
and governorates, Article 121 only applies to regions.
72. The Kurds have gone so far as to interpret the framework of Article 121 to mean
that "any federal law, because it necessarily changes the effective law in the region
existing up to the point of the federal law's enactment, contradicts or conflicts with a law
that is in effect in the region and therefore does not stand unless the region chooses to
adopt it." HAIDAR ALA HAMOUDI, NEGOTIATING IN CIVIL CONFLICT: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION AND IMPERFECT BARGAINING IN IRAQ 159 (2013).
73. Nicole B. Herther-Spiro, Comment, Can Ethnic Federalism Prevent 'Recourse to
Rebellion?" A Comparative Analysis of the Ethiopian and Iraqi Constitutional Structures,
21 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 321, 341 (2007); Article 110, Section 4, Doustour Joumhouriat al-
Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005. The Kurds were extremely
successful in negotiating the shift of exclusive authority in earlier drafts to the list of
concurrent powers. Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish Regional Constitution Within the
Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic
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and powerful primacy clause. Most of the nine federal powers are
unthreatening basic regulatory powers that ensure ease of uniformity
across regions (e.g., regulation of standards of measurement, broadcast
frequencies, and mail).7 4 Per Article 114, shared powers include health
policy, educational policy, development planning, and energy
regulation 75-powers that could be extremely dangerous if they were to
be siphoned to an autocratic central regime via a national primacy
approach to conflict resolution. Outside of these limited areas, powers
are exclusively regional, meaning the provinces of Iraq have, ceteris
paribus, unprecedented power under the new Iraqi federal
constitution. 76
Once again, the determination of whether there is a conflict of
legislation is the threshold issue; as in the national primacy approach, a
determination of conflict, resting upon the initial division of powers and
the contemporary judicial approach to its interpretation, will create an
unconditional preemption of conflicting law. 77 However, complexities
arise; for example, control of oil and gas do not fall within the lists of
exclusive or shared authority, but rather in their own separate,
somewhat vague constitutional provisions. 78 By choosing to consider oil
and gas separately from the regular list of shared powers, the drafters
did not likely intend regional or governorate law to automatically trump
federal legislation via the primacy clauses; 79 instead, the judiciary must
create a separate test to determine the resolution of conflicts concerning
these resources.
As may be intuited, the provincial primacy approach would likely
result in a predilection opposite of any trends created by the national
primacy approach. A fully realized provincial primacy clause may
dangerously flirt with decentralization to the extent that secession or
fragmentation could occur. Citing Article 115 and Article 121, which
Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 707,
754-55 (2010).
74. See Article 110, Section 4, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraqi of 2005.
75. Article 114, Section 4, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
76. Herther-Spiro, supra note 73, at 350. Although Article 122(2) may be used to
circumscribe provincial power by allowing the national government to define the extent of
federal power more precisely via subsequent legislation. See HAMOUDI, supra note 72, at
166-67.
77. Unfortunately, Iraq is currently a poor laboratory for study of the application of the
Article 115 primacy clause as a substantial body of judicial interpretation has not yet been
formed. See Kelly, supra note 73, at 729.
78. See Article 111-12, Section 4, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of
the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
79. See Kelly, supra note 73, at 756.
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enumerates regional powers, critics of Iraqi federalism worry that
regional legislation could supersede the Iraqi Constitution and thereby
unilaterally render the central government ineffective.80 Fragmentation
is an inherent danger to highly decentralized federal states, but
mechanisms can be put into place to ensure foundational national
cohesion. For example, the Iraqi Constitution provides for
Constitutional supremacy, despite the presence of a strong provincial
primacy clause.8 ' A preference for decentralization in situations of
conflicting law is not dispositive of a successful federal central
government.
There is no evidence of another contemporary federal constitution
that utilizes a primacy clause following the approach of provincial
primacy. While there is assuredly variation in the level of
decentralization afforded in federal constitutions, even some of the most
decentralized systems do not seem to employ a provincial primacy
approach to conflict resolution. For example, Switzerland, often
considered one of the most devolved federal systems, employs a fairly
standard national primacy clause.8 2 But perhaps this is to be expected,
as a system so decentralized may be in need of some type of centralizing
mechanism to ensure stability in times of conflict. Only time and the
development of Iraqi jurisprudence will determine the success of their
decentralizing provincial primacy approach to conflict resolution.
C. Conditional Primacy Approach
Unlike the previous two approaches, the final approach to primacy
is not absolutist in nature. A conditional primacy clause is a moderate
answer to legislative conflict that lies somewhere on the spectrum
between national and provincial primacy; it does not promise that
national or provincial legislation "wins" outright whenever it is
established that a conflict is present. Instead, the constitution explicitly
enumerates sets of conditions to direct the process of determining
whether provincial or national law has primacy in that particular
situation. To render an approach flexible enough to address the
80. See Saad Naji Jawad & Sawsan Ismail al-Assaf, Iraqi Federalism: Empowering the
Governorates at the Expense of the State, ALJAZEERA CENTER FOR STUDIES 3-4 (June 27,
2012), http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2012/6/27/20126277
2047220734Iraqi%20federalism.pdf.
81. Article 13,121, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005.
82. See BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 49, para.
1 (Switz.) (stating that: "Federal law takes precedence over any conflicting provision of
cantonal law.").
MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER
multitude of areas in which conflict may arise, a certain amount of
detail and complexity is typically required. Finally, conditional
approaches vary widely among the nations utilizing these primacy
clauses: Is the conflict resolution dependent upon conditions of subject
matter, conditions of effectiveness, or conditions of approval by other
branches?
Three of the nineteen nations with explicit primacy provisions follow
a conditional approach. South Africa, Sudan, and India enumerate
conditional criteria to determine national or provincial primacy in cases
of conflict, but in radically different ways. South Africa lists complex
and detailed subject-matter conditions to determine primacy, while
Sudan's primacy clause demands an analysis of the effectiveness of the
relevant laws, based on aspirational goals. Finally, the primacy clause
of India provides for the primacy of provincial legislation when the
assent of the President is assured. Already, one can see that conditional
primacy clauses are radically variable and highly contextual.
1. South Africa
First, let us turn to South Africa. The South African Constitution
allots a sizeable portion of its text to resolve conflicts of law.8 3 These
provisions lay out, in detail, the process, criteria, and bodies that are
part of the conflict resolution process. First, Section 150 explicitly states
a preference for legislative interpretation that "avoids a conflict, over
any alternative interpretation that results in a conflict."8 4 This explicit
attempt to avoid conflicting law could be reflective of the focus on
harmony, compromise, and reconciliation that was common in the
politics of 1990s South Africa. 85 This provision seems to signify that
courts would rarely utilize the primacy clause, but succeeding judicial
decisions have refused to avoid conflict via interpretative means.86
If a "conflict between national legislation and provincial legislation
falling within a functional area listed in Schedule 4" (the concurrent
powers list) is established, courts must engage in the calculus of Section
146.87 Section 146(5) states that provincial legislation prevails over
83. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 146-50.
84. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 150.
85. Bronstein, supra note 65, at 16-4 to -5.
86. See 1 IAIN CURRIE, JOHAN DE WAAL, PIERRE DE Vos, KARTHY GOVENDER & HEINZ
KLUG, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 221-22 & n.470 (lain Currie &
Johan De Waal eds., 2001). Although a literal interpretation of Section 150 may seem to
call for a direct conflict approach, if this was the case Section 146 would be rendered
meaningless. Article 146 anticipates that the judiciary will play an active role in the
resolution of legislative conflict. Bronstein, supra note 65, at 16-16 to -17.
87. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 146(1).
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national legislation, as long as the conditions enumerated in Section
146(2)-(3) do not apply-otherwise the preference for provincial primacy
is overridden in favor of the national legislation.8 8 The conditions that
result in national primacy are based upon values of effectiveness, unity,
and necessity. National legislation prevails over provincial legislation if:
(i) the matter cannot be regulated effectively by
provincial legislation;8 9
(ii) the matter requires uniformity and the national
legislation establishes norms and standards, a
framework, or national policies;90
(iii) the national legislation is necessary for
maintenance of national security or economic
unity, the protection of the common market,
cross-provincial economic activity, or equal
access to the government, or the protection of the
environment;9 1 or
(iv) the national legislation intends to prevent
unreasonable provincial action that is prejudicial
to the economic, health, or security interests of
other provinces or the nation, or provincial
88. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 146(5).
89. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 146(2)(a). Uniformity should not be advanced for the sake of
uniformity. "It is inherent in our constitutional system, which is a balance between
centralized government and federalism, that on matters in respect of which the provinces
have legislative powers they can legislate separately and differently. That will necessarily
mean that there is no uniformity." Bronstein, supra note 65, at 16-22 (quoting the
Constitutional Court in Mashavha v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Others,
2005 (2) SA 476 (CC), 2004 (12) BCLR 1243 (CC) at 49 (S. Afr.)).
90. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 146(2)(b)(i)-(iii); see discussion supra note 89. Also,
framework legislation does not per se fulfill uniformity requirements here; the uniformity
criterion is actually a significant limitation on overrides of provincial primacy. Bronstein,
supra note 65, at 16-24 (citing Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC), 1997 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 157 (S.
Mr.) [hereinafter Second Certification Judgment]).
91. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 146(2)(c)(i)-(vi). "Some deference to the national authority
in these areas is inevitable." Bronstein, supra note 65, at 16-21 (quoting Certification of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at n.277 (S. Aft.)
(First Certification decision). However, in the Second Certification Judgment, the Court
explicitly stated that the determination of necessity is objectively justiciable without any
presumption in favor of national primacy. Id. at 16-25 to 16-26 (citing Second Certification
Judgment at 155).
MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER
action that impedes implementation of national
economic policy.92
While provincial primacy is the default, the wide-ranging conditions
that override this presumption give the national government significant
power to influence conflict outcomes. Still, the drafting process indicates
that the analysis of the South African primacy clause should not regard
provincial legislation lightly. Section 146 should not be discounted-it
will hopefully develop a robust jurisprudence and effectively facilitate
democratic accountability at the appropriate level, creating meaningful
federalism. 93
The National Council of Provinces (NCOP)-the upper house of the
Parliament of South Africa, which is comprised of delegations from each
of the nine South African provincial legislatures-also plays a
significant role in conflict resolution. First, when determining the
necessity of national legislation for conflict resolution purposes, the
approval or rejection by the NCOP must be given "due regard."94
Second, subordinate legislation-law not made by a legislative body,
typically regulations and proclamations 95-at both the national and
provincial level must have the approval of the NCOP to prevail when it
is in conflict with legislation from another sphere.96 The prevailing
legislation is automatically approved if the NCOP does not reach a
decision within thirty days.97 If the NCOP does not approve, it must
provide reasoning to the authority that referred the law to it.98
Significantly, when subordinate legislation is involved, the NCOP takes
on a powerful oversight role that it normally does not fill.99 Because the
92. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 146(3)(a)-(b). It is noteworthy that, unlike 146(2) conditions
for national primacy, national legislation fulfilling the conditions in 146(3) are not
required to apply uniformly with regard to the country as a whole. No case has yet
determined what action by a province is unreasonable under this section. It is likely a
high threshold, meant to target renegade provincial legislation. Bronstein, supra note 65,
at 16-28.
93. Bronstein, supra note 65, at 16-18. The two Certification Judgments significantly
toned down original drafts of Article 146 that would have made it a "rubber stamp for
centralism." Id.
94. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 146(4). The Second Certification Judgment Court interprets
"due regard" to signify only that consideration must be given to the NCOP decision.
Bronstein, supra note 65, at 16-26 (quoting Second Certification Judgment at 155).
95. CHRISTINA MURRAY & LIA NIJZINK, BUILDING REPRESENTATIVE DEMOcRAcY: SOUTH
AFRICA'S LEGISLATURES AND THE CONSTITUTION 107 (2002).
96. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 146(6).
97. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 146(7).
98. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §146(8).
99. See MURRAY & NIJZINK, supra note 95, at 108. "In the national Parliament, the
main responsibility for overseeing subordinate legislation rests with the National
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NCOP is composed of delegations sent by the provincial legislatures,
these provisions ensure the provinces as a whole, albeit via a national
body, have a say in the determination of primacy. Indeed, the courts
may more generally regard the position of the NCOP when resolving
any conflicts of law, reflecting the South African dedication to
cooperative government and the NCOP's role as the coordinator of
national and provincial legislative efforts. 100
The South African Constitution also creates a hierarchy of law in
the event of conflicts beyond legislation. If there is a conflict between
national legislation and provincial constitutional provisions, provincial
constitutions are given no special status and will be dealt with in the
same manner as conflicts between national and provincial legislation
regarding concurrent competences.10 If a court cannot resolve a conflict
by any of the above processes, then national legislation prevails.102 The
court does not invalidate de jure the preempted legislation, but that
legislation will be temporarily inactive as long as the prevailing
legislation is in effect. 03 This distinction-which is fairly common to
primacy provisions, but atypically explicit here-ensures that
subordinated law remains in force to the extent that it does not conflict
with the prevailing law and will revive if the conflict falls away for some
reason. 104
The Constitution of South Africa contains, by far, the most
comprehensive primacy clause. Existing case law, though exceedingly
sparse, indicates that the multilayered considerations and conditions
used by the Constitutional Court create a complex but workable means
by which to determine primacy. It would be premature to conclude that
this conditional primacy clause will perfectly maintain or adjust, as
needed, the delicate balance of federalism. However, it is reasonable to
intimate that conflict resolution in South Africa will more effectively
maintain the balance of power than the other primacy approaches,
possibly because this conditional primacy clause adheres to and invokes
the very factors and values that informed the initial choice of federalism
Assembly." Id. The review of subordinate legislation typically utilizes clear standards to
determine its legality and constitutionality. Id. It may be that the NCOP does not have
procedures in place to implement the processes dictated by Sections 146(6-8). Id.
100. See CURRIE & DE WAAL, supra note 86, at 221.
101. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 147(1); Certification of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 150 para. 269 (First Certification decision).
102. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 148. It is currently unclear when this clause will come into
play.
103. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 149.
104. CURRIE & DE WAAL, supra note 86, at 222.
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and the chosen constitutional balance of power.1 0 5 Nonetheless,
principles of cooperative federalism are strongly adhered to and
intergovernmental dispute is only brought to the courts as a last resort;
therefore, while the South African primacy clause may serve as a model
approach, political bargaining will ultimately determine the future
balance of power in this country. 0 6
2. Sudan
A much simpler conditional primacy clause can be found in the
Sudanese Constitution and the 2005 Interim Constitution of Southern
Sudan, albeit not the current Constitution of South Sudan. The Interim
South Sudan Constitution mirrors Sudan's exactly in this respect, so I
will refer solely to the latter's Constitution. Below the schedules of
concurrent and exclusive powers, Schedule F pertains to the resolution
of conflicts in respect to laws concerning concurrent powers. 0 7
Whichever conflicting legislation deals most effectively with the subject
matter, considering the following criteria, shall prevail:
(1) The need to recognize the sovereignty of the Nation
while accommodating the autonomy of Southern Sudan
or of the states; (2) whether there is a need for National
or Southern Sudan norms and standards; (3) the
principle of subsidiarity; and (4) the need to promote the
welfare of the people and to protect each person's human
rights and fundamental freedoms. 08
Citing effectiveness, the aspirational goals listed in Schedule F steer
the courts when determining primacy in Sudan. Autonomy, unity,
subsidiarity, and the protection of fundamental rights motivate conflict
resolution in the courts. Within this clause there is no preference for
provincial or national dominance (i.e., there is no default rule here). The
105. The South African distribution of powers is highly influenced by the German
cooperative government notion, with many concurrent powers and a few exclusive powers.
Extensive national legislation in areas of concurrent jurisdiction, the dominance of one
party politically, and values of cooperative government have resulted in a largely
administrative role for provinces. See Nico Steytler, Republic of South Africa, in 1 A
GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE
IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 312, 325-28 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr ed., 2005).
106. See id. at 328. While not within the scope of this note, political bargaining is just as
influential, and likely more influential, than constitutional primacy provisions when
considering conflict resolution between the central government and periphery.
107. See SUDAN CONST., 2005, sched. F.
108. SUDAN CONST., 2005, sched. F.
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initial constitutional division of power and the development of conflict
resolution jurisprudence will determine the lasting effect of this unique
primacy clause, which does little more than remind courts of the
principles they should strive for as they rule on legislative conflicts. 0 9
The possibility also remains that Sudan will alter the Sudanese
Constitution to follow a more national primacy approach now that
South Sudan has seceded. 110
3. India
Finally, India's Constitution of 1949 contains a primacy clause
worth examination. First, one must understand that the Constitution
relays a detailed list of national, provincial, and concurrent powers,
with residuary powers going to the national legislature.11 1 Interestingly,
the Constitution also provides means by which the national legislature
can acquire the temporary ability to make law relating to matters on
the exclusive list of provincial powers. This temporary ability is granted
through special approval of the Council of States (the upper house of the
legislature, which represents the states) or if there is a state of
emergency. 1 2 Additionally, if two or more states agree, those states may
consent to relinquish some of their exclusive power for regulation by the
national legislature.'1 3 It is important to keep this complex system of
power distribution, which allows both temporary and permanent
subsumption of provincial power, in mind when considering India's
primacy clause.
Article 254 creates a default of national primacy in case of conflict
between national and provincial law regarding any matter found in the
Concurrent List, and, therefore, the provincial law to the extent of
109. The Sudanese federal constitutional structure and division of power creates
concentric circles of power, much like the United States. The powers of the provincial
legislature and constitutions, especially because of overarching administrative units,
cannot conflict with the powers of the national legislature, which are fairly extensive.
Lakshman Marasinghe, Constitutional Structures: Lessons from Aceh and The Sudan, 14
ASIA PAc. L. REV. 177, 183-84 (2006).
110. Southern Sudan, as a region, played a major role in the development of the
Sudanese Constitution and the agreements that resulted in the 2005 constitution. It will
be interesting to see if this primacy clause will remain in the constitution now that South
Sudan is a sovereign nation, and there is less of a need to devolve power to maintain
unity.
111. See INDIA CONST. arts. 245-248. See generally George Mathew, Republic of India,
in 2 A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM: DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS 156 (Akhtar Majeed et al. eds., 2006) for a
thorough discussion of the complex constitutional distribution of powers in India.
112. See INDIA CONST. arts. 249-251.
113. INDIA CONST. art. 252.
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repugnancy will be found void.114 While Section One of the Article seems
to be a typical national primacy clause, Section Two provides conditions
that can award primacy to provincial law. If the conflicting provincial
law receives the assent of the President and does not prevent the
national legislature from subsequently amending or repealing the
provincial law, then provincial law will prevail.1 15 However, this
condition for provincial primacy is rarely utilized and repugnant
provincial law is usually voided and even subordinated in its own field
or in a field of concurrent power.116
4. The European Union
These examples of conditional primacy clauses vary radically, but
they all have elements of subsidiarity within their approaches. This is
not surprising, as the purpose of subsidiarity is to strike an effective
balance between national and provincial power. Subsidiarity "expresses
a preference for governance at the most local level consistent with
achieving government's stated purposes." 117 It is a complex and
unwieldy doctrinal aspiration that should not be viewed in isolation
from the values it is meant to protect. 118 The European Union serves as
the most developed example of a system with explicit subsidiarity
requirements; the principle was first spelled out in Article 3b of the
Maastricht European Community Treaty:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
114. INDIA CONST. art. 254, § 1.
115. INDIA CONST. art. 254, § 2.
116. See Akhtar Majeed, Republic of India, in 1 A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM:
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 180, 193
(John Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr eds., 2005). The limited powers given to the states and
broad powers given to the Union under the Union and Concurrent Lists should not be
thought of as resulting in competing centers of power but as creating co-partners in the
task of nation building. Id.
117. Bermann, supra note 66, at 339.
118. Id. at 339-43 (listing these values: self-determination and accountability, political
liberty, flexibility, preservation of identities, diversity, and respect for internal divisions of
component states).
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proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community. 119
The Community could only take action if the member states could not
sufficiently achieve the objectives of the action or if the Community
could better achieve the action because of scale or effects; and, if actions
were taken, they could not go beyond that needed to achieve Treaty
objectives. 120 Treaty chapters, which brought new substantive spheres
within Union action, cemented this principle. 121 The subsidiarity
principle was retained by the Lisbon Treaty and embodied in Article
5(3)-(4) Treaty on European Union (TEU) and requires the use of
competence to be determined by subsidiarity and proportionality. 122
The Subsidiarity Protocol of the European Union provides recourse
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in case of infringement, which
would typically be signified by a conflict between the EU and Member
State legislation. 123 There are mechanisms in place now by which a
Member State can bring an action to begin ECJ adjudication on behalf
of its parliament, but the intensity of judicial review is still in
question. 124 To date, the ECJ has shown a "light" judicial approach to
subsidiarity by not typically overturning EU action on the grounds of
subsidiarity. 125 ECJ judicial review of subsidiarity is like walking an
incredibly fine line: a review that is too light will eventually leave
subsidiarity an empty principle and result in increased fear of
centralized power, while a more rigorous approach could entrench the
court in a "complex socio-economic calculus concerning the most
effective level of government for different regulatory tasks." Rigorous
socioeconomic calculus is not a job typically for the judiciary, 126
especially a supranational judiciary less aware of domestic context.
119. Treaty on European Union art. 3(b), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, amended by
Treaty of Lisbon Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. The final paragraph of this article
expresses the principle of proportionality: "Any action by the Community shall not go
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty." Id.
120. CRAIG & DR BtRCA, supra note 21, at 94.
121. See Bermann, supra note 66, at 346.
122. CRAIG & DE BPRCA, supra note 21, at 95.
123. Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union art. 263, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J.
(C 115) 1; CRAIG & DE BfYRCA, supra note 21, at 98.
124. CRAIG & DE BfiRCA, supra note 21, at 98.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 99. Estella argues that defining ex ante criteria to limit central intervention
will meet little success. "The functional interconnection between regulatory areas, and
within the same regulatory area among different regulator levels, makes the task of
establishing clear dividing lines difficult." ESTELLA, supra note 24, at 114. "Community
intervention, far from being hindered by material subsidiarity could even be encouraged
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EU subsidiarity is an ongoing development, an experiment in hopes
of attaining a sustainable balance of power, where power is devolved to
the maximum extent possible while still developing and maintaining
effective central governance. It is the same balancing act faced by every
federal system wishing to create a conflict resolution scheme that will
maintain the balance achieved by an initial division of powers. EU
subsidiarity principles may prove especially informative to nations
following a conditional primacy approach, which applies related
concepts. Just as it is difficult to determine and enshrine a balance of
powers that addresses the social issues that demand federalism, a
conditional approach to conflict resolution that stays true to these
founding values is just as difficult to enshrine in a constitution. An ex
ante attempt to detail primacy conditions is daunting and not always
successful in maintaining balance. Despite this difficulty, a conditional
approach allows for strategic consideration of the inevitable conflict
inherent in federal systems. By pondering and addressing possible
future conflicts at the time of constitution making, a conditional
primacy clause can provide nuanced and flexible approaches for conflict
resolution that are meant to enshrine and further the values originally
determinative of federalism and power balance.
Only three of the nineteen federal constitutions with explicit
primacy clauses currently conform to the conditional primacy approach:
South Africa, Sudan, and India. While the conditional approach to
primacy may prove to be more effective within a vacuum, it is the
interrelationship between the clause, its provisions, and the rest of the
constitution that will be determinative of successful maintenance of the
balance of powers. The difficulties here lie in the actual drafting of a
clause; it must be effective enough to avoid absolute siphoning of power
toward one level of government, but clear enough to avoid ineffectuality.
Additionally, a "perfect" primacy clause may prove restrictive if it
prevents any subsequent shifts in power dynamics between the nation
and provinces.
CONCLUSION
Just the act of categorizing and creating a typology of primacy
clauses alone brings questions and hypotheses to mind. The majority of
primacy clauses provide absolute national supremacy in case of conflict.
How have these clauses exacerbated the tilting of power toward the
central government of those countries? Do these clauses interact
from the optic of the criteria that the Protocol employs materially to define the principle."
Id.
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differently with the varied means of dividing power and the degree of
specificity afforded to them in the constitution? To what degree does
their clarity affect their effectiveness? This Note takes the first step in
addressing these questions by creating a terminology and calling
attention to a gap in the literature. The next step is to think about what
questions need to be asked and attempt to find answers to those
questions through thorough case study analysis and comparative
research.
Primacy clauses are pertinent to the contemporary world of
developing nations and of practical assistance to constitutional
consultants. State creation and constitution-drafting processes have
increasingly swept the world in wave after wave since 1780,127 with no
end in sight. The delicate balance of power that results in effective and
fair federal governance is not achieved immediately upon the creation of
a novel federal constitution, but only after that constitution stands the
tests of time. The internal conflict between national and state
legislatures, if not effectively resolved, will shake-possibly
fundamentally-the balance that is foundational to federalism. The
primacy clause affects the maintenance of that balance over time. While
most countries adhere to an absolutist approach that likely contributes
to the siphoning of power toward the national government, there are
examples of more nuanced conditional approaches that attempt to
enshrine and balance values of effectiveness, proportionality, unity, and
autonomy.
The conditional primacy clauses of South Africa and Sudan are
distinctively different from each other in approach, but both are worth
further exploration and consideration by constitution designers of
federal systems. South Africa's clause considers conflicts concerning a
vast range of matters and thereby provides detailed guidance in an
attempt to maintain the original balance of powers between national
and provincial legislation. Sudan provides broad value statements to
guide courts when they determine the level of governance that would
most effectively legislate on the matter at hand. Countries create a
division of powers between multiple levels of government for complex
and politically motivated reasons. Therefore, the successful
maintenance of that delicate balance of power requires a tailored and
flexible approach that ensures those foundational reasons for federalism
are continually considered. Effective federal governance is realized
through conflict, and a constitution should explicitly provide
127. See Jon Elster, Essay, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,
45 DUKE L.J. 364, 368-73 (1995) (describing the history of constitution creation).
MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER 735
mechanisms to effectively weather and realign the balance of power in
times of such conflict.
